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Abstract1— This paper describes the joint effort of the two 
FP7 EU projects CLERECO and MoRV toward the definition of 
an extended reliability information exchange format able to 
manage reliability information for the full system stack, from 
technology up to the software level. The paper starts from the 
RIIF language initiative, proposing a set of new features to 
improve the expression power of the language and to extend it to 
the software layer of a system. The proposed extended reliability 
information exchange format named RIIF-2 has the potential to 
support the development of next generation reliability analysis 
tools that will help to fully include reliability evaluation into an 
automated design flow, pushing cross-layer reliability 
considerations at the same level of importance as area, timing 
and power consumption when performing design exploration for 
new products. 
Keywords— reliability, robustness, design flow, modeling 
languages 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Reliability has always been a serious issue for IC designers, 
recently exacerbated by the innovations required to continue 
transistor miniaturization such as FinFET transistors, high-k 
gate dielectrics, etc. [1]. At current levels of integration, 
reliability is a fundamental design dimension that must be 
considered early in the design flow together with area, timing 
and power. Failing to meet necessary reliability requirements 
may add excessive re-design costs to recover and may generate 
severe consequences on the success and profitability of a 
product [2]. Today, reliability analysis is mostly focused at the 
technology and circuit level. Excessive margining and 
overdesign are often required to show a product will operate 
safely over its full lifetime. However, technology scaling is 
evolving so quickly that this approach is impacting the 
performance, area, and power benefits of new technologies to a 
level that makes reliability oriented overdesign economically 
not sustainable [3]. To overcome this limit, cross-layer 
approaches in which reliability levels of complex systems are 
sustained by techniques that operate at all levels of the system 
stack (i.e., technology, hardware architecture and software) 
                                                            
1 This paper has been fully supported by the 7th Framework Program of the 
European Union through the CLERECO Project (http://www.clereco.eu), under 
Grant Agreement 611404 and through the MoRV Project (http://morv-
project.eu), under Grant Agreement 619234. 
have been proposed [4][5][6][7][8]. The research community 
often focuses on efficient implementations of cross-layer 
approaches for a specific sample design. However, tools for 
reliability analysis are still at their early stages compared to 
other very mature EDA design tools and this represents a major 
issue for mainstream applications. This lack of tools is partly 
the result of a lack of standardization of file formats and the 
lack of powerful languages to express reliability information at 
all levels of the system stack [9].  
Nowadays, reliability information for complex digital 
systems is mainly confined to the technology and circuit level. 
At these levels, there is a deep knowledge of the different 
failure mechanisms. However, cross-layer optimization 
requires a comprehensive full system model that includes all 
failure types and the propagation of their effect to higher levels 
of the system stack. This is a fundamental requirement to 
enable improved methodologies for analyzing the reliability of 
systems built from unreliable components and process 
technologies. An overly simplified reliability description 
formalism often used for system level reliability analysis is 
Reliability Block Diagrams (RBDs) [10][11]. Although RBDs 
cannot be classified as a language for reliability information 
management, they allow for simple descriptions and 
characterization of a system. Each block in a RBD represents a 
system component with an associated failure rate. The structure 
of the RBD defines the logical interactions of failures within a 
system that are required to sustain correct system operation. 
More recently we have observed an increased call for the 
definition of standardized languages allowing the 
formalization, specification and modeling of extra-functional 
reliability properties to enable a major productivity 
improvement in the design of fault tolerant systems by 
integrating automatic reliability analysis within the existing 
silicon design flow. Among the different projects, the RIIF 
(Reliability Information Interchange Format) initiative 
launched by iROC Technologies and supported by the FP7 EU 
Project MoRV (Modeling Reliability under Variability) is 
gaining a major interest from the research community [12][9]. 
RIIF is a machine-readable format able to describe the failure 
mechanisms associated with a generic hardware component as 
well as a basic hardware system, through the decomposition of 
complex components into simpler ones. In particular, using 
RIIF, failure modes of a component can be expressed as 
functions of its related parameters. Despite taking a significant 
step toward the definition of a reliability management 
description language, RIIF still has some limitations and room 
for improvement. In particular, the initial RIIF model mainly 
focused on the description of hardware related reliability 
information without considering the higher layers of the stack, 
which may require further extensions of the language in order 
to cope with their complexity. 
In this context, the FP7 EU project CLERECO (Cross-
Layer Early Reliability Evaluation for the Computing 
cOntinuum), which focuses on the development of tools and 
methods for early reliability analysis of complex digital 
systems, has joined forces with the MoRV project working on 
an revised version of the RIIF language (RIIF-2) able to model 
and manage reliability information with a wider scope. In 
particular the introduced extensions take into account that a 
system is composed of both hardware and software 
components, and the language must be broad enough to 
encapsulate the effect of both categories of components and to 
link information among layers in order to properly describe 
how errors propagate and are handled within the system. This 
way, it is possible to distribute the reliability analysis 
throughout the design flow of a system and to propagate 
information across different levels of the system stack. 
Moreover, when introducing all levels of the system stack the 
volume of information increases significantly. The introduction 
of concepts such as inheritance and advanced templates, 
common in high-level programming languages, will help in 
effectively managing the information and overcoming the 
limitations of the simple template mechanism available in the 
original RIIF definition. This paper summarizes the result of 
this joint effort providing a short overview of the basic RIIF 
concepts as originally developed and focusing on the proposed 
extensions to move the language toward the management of 
reliability information for the full system stack.  
The paper is organized as follows: section II reviews the 
basic RIIF concepts and describes the main extensions being 
proposed, whereas section III focuses on how the extended 
RIIF language can be used to model reliability information for 
software components. Finally section IV provides information 
on the status of the implementation of the extended language 
and section V summarizes the main contributions and 
concludes the paper. 
II. RIIF LANGUAGE EXTENSION 
The goal of the RIIF-2 language is twofold: (i) enabling 
new, powerful language structures able to cope with the 
complexity of the full system stack, and (ii) extending the RIIF 
description capability to the software components of the 
system. This section focuses on the first of these two goals. The 
RIIF language is extended in order to provide additional 
flexibility in the description by introducing new keywords and 
statements and by broadening the usage of some already 
defined language mechanisms. In particular, the following 
extensions have been introduced:  
• An advanced template mechanism. In order to exploit 
modularity and reuse for generic components, it is 
important to ensure that description of similar modules 
(e.g., SRAMs from different suppliers) is consistent. RIIF 
already includes a simple template mechanism to 
accomplish this goal, which is extended with dedicated 
statements to improve the readability of the language and to 
allow for complex uses such as implementation of multiple 
templates from a single component.  
• A full inheritance mechanism. Components can be often 
classified into families that share overall characteristics 
with small differences (e.g., different models of a single 
microprocessor). The availability of an inheritance 
mechanism will significantly reduce redundancy in the 
description of families of components enabling for 
optimized information management, and reduced risk of 
modeling errors.  
• Complex data structures. Reliability information may 
require data aggregation to ease recurrent operations during 
computational activities such as failure rates evaluation. 
Complex data structures introduced in the RIIF-2 language 
include associative arrays and clustered data in the form of 
tables. Moreover a new indexing operator to easily access 
subsets of data in a table is proposed.  
A. Brief RIIF Overview 
This section reviews the basic RIIF concepts. Interested 
readers may refer to [12] for a detailed description of the initial 
language. In RIIF, the keyword component is used to model 
a system component representing the main RIIF entity. 
Together with the component two additional types of entities 
are available: (1) the reliability requirements that a component 
has to meet (requirement keyword), and (2) the 
environment under which the component is going to operate 
(environment keyword) whose characteristics can be used 
to express different parameters of a components (e.g., the error 
rate of a device is a function of the temperature whose range is 
defined based on the environment). To parameterize entities, 
RIIF offers two alternatives (keywords): constants 
(constant keyword) and parameters (parameter 
keyword). The main difference is that constants express static 
values whereas parameters express variable values computed 
as a function of other constants and parameters. In terms of 
reliability, within a component, the user is able to declare 
different failure modes (fail_mode keyword) and their rate 
of occurrence can be expressed as a function of any other 
already defined parameters or other failure modes. Fig. 1 
outlines an example of the basic usage of constants and 
parameters applied to the definition of a simple SRAM 
component. Both parameters and constants are defined by a 
label (e.g., VOLTAGE in Fig. 1) and by a data type defining the 
kind of information they store. Examples of allowed data types 
are: boolean, integer, float, enum (for enumerative 
items), time (to define timing related information), etc. The 
value assignment is optional (it can be set later in the 
definition) and the actual value can be either explicit or a 
formula (SBU’RATE at line 27 of Fig. 1 is expressed in terms 
of other constants and parameters). 
The assign keyword is used to assign a value to a 
parameter or to an attribute of a parameter (referred through a 
tick(') and its label). Attributes of a parameter are free, and 
enable to specify simple aggregated information, such as units 
(metrics) and descriptions. Users can define failure modes in a 
similar fashion as parameters. As an example, Fig. 1 shows the 
definition of three failure modes (SBU, MBU and SEFI) 
using the fail_mode keyword that helps to distinguish 
between general parameters and failure modes. 
 
Fig. 1. RIIF description of a simple SRAM component. 
B. RIIF-2 Extensions 
In RIIF, the possibility to define templates is limited to the 
definition of a hardware component in which common desired 
information is listed without providing values. While this 
mechanism is effective for small libraries of components, an 
explicit set of statements to define and manipulate templates is 
desirable to improve the robustness of RIIF descriptions in case 
of large libraries and to simplify the implementation of 
automatic verification tools. In order to implement a full 
template mechanism (such as in most high-level programming 
languages), RIIF-2 introduces a new template statement. A 
template enables to define a set of constants, parameters and 
failure modes that must be defined in all components 
implementing the template. The example of Fig. 2 defines a 
template for an SRAM (lines 1-24) and one for a flip-chip 
package (lines 33-44). Predefined values for parameters and 
constants can be defined directly in the template as for instance 
PACKAGE_TEMP’UNITS (line 39). In a template, predefined 
values can be assigned either inline or through the new 
introduced keyword impose. The value of predefined 
parameters and constants does not need to be reassigned in 
those components implementing the template. Undefined 
values can be defined through the use of the abstract 
keyword. Within a template, each definition identified with the 
abstract keyword simply includes a label and a data type as 
for instance the definition of the CORE_VOLTAGE parameter 
(lines 4-7). Abstract parameters identify mandatory 
information that must be defined in all components 
implementing the template. Once a template is applied to a 
component, the user is required to define the actual values for 
all abstract items described within the template. The 
application of a template to a component is described through 
the new keyword implements as for example at line 46 
where a flip-chip SRAM is defined. Multiple templates can be 
implemented by the same components, thus allowing complex 
usages when a complex hierarchy of components must be 
described. In our example the defined component implements 
both the SRAM and the package template. 
 
Fig. 2. RIIF-2 description of a flip-chip synchronous SRAM. 
The expression power of the improved template mechanism is 
further increased when coupled with the introduction of the 
inheritance capability of RIIF-2. Inheritance is described by 
redefining the use of the extends keyword used in RIIF to 
denote the implementation of components from templates. 
Through inheritance, both templates and components can 
be redefined, thus creating new templates or components that 
inherit all the definitions contained in their parent and modify 
only those portions that differ. Lines 26-31 of Fig. 2 define a 
synchronous SRAM template that extends the basic SRAM 
definition. This refined template defines the SRAM clock 
frequency as an additional parameter required to characterize 
the component. Together with the extends keyword the new 
keyword self is used whenever a child template/component 
01:component SIMPLE_SRAM; 
02: 
03:   // Parameter Declaration 
04:   parameter VOLTAGE : float := 1.0; 
05:   assign VOLTAGE'UNITS = VOLTS; 
06:   parameter DIE_TEMP : float := 25.0; 
07:   assign DIE_TEMP'UNITS = CELSIUS; 
08: 
09:   // Parameter to be modified by user 
10:   parameter NUM_BITS : integer := 1024*1024; //number of bits 
11: 
12:   // Constants specific to modeling this SRAM 
13:   constant A_DIFF : float    := 3.2; 
14:   constant Q_COL_EFF : float := 0.6; 
15:   constant MBU_RATIO : float := 0.25; 
16: 
17:   // Define Radiation Induced Failure Modes 
18:   fail_mode SBU;  // Rad. induced single bit error 
19:   fail_mode MBU;  // Rad. induced multiple bit error (same word) 
20:   fail_mode SEFI; // Radiation induced failure of entire device 
21:    
22:   assign SBU'UNITS = FITS; 
23:   assign MBU'UNITS = FITS; 
24:   assign SEFI'UNITS = FITS; 
25: 
26:   // Equations to specify rate of defined failure modes 
27:   assign SBU'RATE = NUM_BITS * A_DIFF * EXP( - CORE_VOLTAGE /  
                        Q_COL_EFF );  
28:   assign MBU'RATE = SBE'RATE * MBU_RATIO; 
29:   assign SEFI'RATE = 10; // obtained from testing 
30: 
31:endcomponent SIMPLE_SRAM 
01:template SRAM_TEMPLATE; 
02: 
03:  // All SRAMs must define voltage, temperature and size  
04:  abstract constant          NAME : string; 
05:  abstract constant  MANUFACTURER : string; 
06:  abstract parameter CORE_VOLTAGE : float; 
07:  abstract parameter     NUM_BITS : integer; 
08: 
09:  // All SRAMs must have radiation induced failure modes 
10:  fail_mode RAD_FM[]; 
11:  // All SRAMs must have permanent failure modes 
12:  fail_mode PER_FM[]; 
13: 
14:  abstract        RAD_FM[SBU]’RATE;  // single bit upset 
15:  impose          RAD_FM[SBU]’UNITS  = FITS;   
16:  abstract        RAD_FM[MBU]’RATE;  // multiple bit upset 
17:  impose          RAD_FM[MBU]’UNITS  = FITS;  
18:  abstract        RAD_FM[SEFI]’RATE;  // control logic errors 
19:  impose          RAD_FM[SEFI]’UNITS = FITS;  
20:  abstract        RAD_FM[SEL]’RATE;  // single event latchup 
21:  impose          RAD_FM[SEL]’UNITS = FITS;  
22:  abstract        PER_FM[SSAF]’RATE;  // single stuck-at fault  
23:  impose          PER_FM[SSAF]’UNITS = FITS;  
24:endtemplate 
25: 
26:template SYNCSRAM_TEMPLATE extends SRAM_TEMPLATE; 
27:  //All synchronous SRAM must specify the clock speed. 
28:  abstract parameter CLK_Speed      : integer; 
29:  impose   CLK_Speed’UNITS= MHZ; 
30:   ..... 
31:endtemplate 
32: 
33:template FLIP_CHIP_TEMPLATE; 
34: 
35:// All flip-chip packages must contain the following info. 
36: abstract constant                NAME : string; 
37: abstract parameter          NUM_BUMPS : integer; 
38: abstract parameter       PACKAGE_TEMP : float; 
39: impose     PACKAGE_TEMP’UNITS = CELSIUS; 
40: 
41: // All Flip-Chip packages have these failure mechanisms 
42: abstract fail_mode       OPEN_BUMP; 
43: abstract fail_mode       DIE_CRACK; 
44:endtemplate 
45: 
46:component CY7C1263XV18 implements 
SYNCSRAM_TEMPLATE,FLIP_CHIP_TEMPLATE; 
47: 
48: set SYNCSRAM_TEMPLATE.NAME  = "CY7C1263VX18"; 
49: set MANUFACTURER            = "CYPRESS"; 
50: set CORE_VOLTAGE            = 1.8; 
51: set NUM_BITS                = 37748736;   // 36 Mbit 
52: set CLK_Speed               = 633; 
53: set FLIP_CHIP_TEMPLATE.NAME = “165-LBGA”; 
54: set NUM_BUMPS    = 165; 
55: set PACKAGE_TEMP’MIN   = 0; 
56: set PACKAGE_TEMP’MAX   = 70; 
57: set RAD_FM[SBU]’RATE    = .....; 
58: set PER_FM[SSAF]’RATE       = .....; 
59: endcomponent  
needs to redefine the value of a constant/parameter based on 
the value of the same constant/parameter defined in the parent 
template/component. An example of usage of this mechanism 
is presented subsequently in Fig. 4.  
Further language extensions proposed in this paper focus on 
the introduction of complex data structures. The RIIF language 
only supports the definition of fixed size numerically indexed 
arrays. However, in several cases information must be 
associated to a set of labels to make it easy its retrieval during 
automated system reliability analysis. For this reason, the RIIF-
2 language includes a new associative array data type. An 
example of an associative array is the definition of the SRAM 
failure modes in Fig. 2. In order to group them into radiation 
induced failure modes and permanent failure modes they are 
defined through two associative arrays (RAD_FM and 
PER_FM at lines 10 and 12). The empty brackets are used to 
denote the associative arrays. In particular they indicate that the 
number of elements is undefined and new elements can be 
freely appended to the array. The index of each element is 
defined when the element is created: 
<VECTOR_NAME>[<element_label>] = <value>. In 
this way, there is no need to number the vector elements and 
the access is based on the label used as an index. Finally, the 
extended RIIF language introduces a new data type: table. 
Tables are the perfect data structure whenever groups of 
heterogeneous information must be aggregated together to 
maintain their informative content. The definition of a table 
includes the definition of a header defining the columns of the 
table and the definition of the table content. An example of its 
use is provided in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 later in the paper. Together 
with the table data type a new operator denoted with the 
symbol [#]is introduced. When applied to a table column it 
denotes an iterative access to all rows of the table. It is 
particularly useful whenever the value of a parameter must be 
expressed as a function of values contained in a table. 
III. SOFTWARE COMPONENTS CHARACTERIZATION 
The software layer (i.e., firmware, system and application 
software) is a key element of a complex digital system and 
plays a key role from the reliability standpoint [14]. While raw 
errors are generated at the technology level due to undesired 
effects such as ageing, environmental stress, variability etc., 
many detectable errors can be gracefully managed by correct 
software handling and a significant portion of the undetectable 
errors may be masked, depending on the application. The 
software routines executed in a complex system play a 
significant role in introducing this type of masking effects and 
must be properly characterized when implementing cross-layer 
reliability solutions to potentially reduce the design margins 
imposed at the hardware level.  Software components are in 
general difficult to profile. They can be characterized statically 
(i.e., without execution), or dynamically (i.e., collecting run-
time information). Dynamic properties are particularly difficult 
to collect since they are strongly related to the input data sets.  
This section overviews how the expression power of RIIF-2 
can be used to model and manage reliability related 
information for software components, thus addressing the full 
system stack. In order to properly model software components 
in RIIF-2 we started from the identification of a preliminary set 
of general parameters required to express basic properties of a 
software component that may influence its ability to mask or 
propagate hardware faults:  
• software class to distinguish among firmware, system and 
application software, etc. Each class can be further split into 
subclasses. 
• code size. It can be expressed as: (i) the number of high 
level code lines,  (ii) the number of assembly instructions, 
(iii) the size of the binary code. Moreover, it can be 
statically computed or dynamically computed based on the 
execution of a set of workloads. 
• number of loops to count how many loops are statically 
defined in the software code and how many times they are 
executed for selected workloads. 
• variable lifetime to identify those variables with longer life 
and therefore higher chance to be corrupted. It could be an 
average value or a distribution function. 
• algorithm complexity computed in general as a function of 
other parameters such as size, number of loops, etc.  
• read access rate/count to count the memory read 
operations. It can be statically or dynamically computed. 
• write access rate/count to count the memory write 
operations similarly to the read access rate.  
• cache miss rate/count to count cache misses. It can be 
collected through dynamic analysis resorting to hardware 
facilities available in most commercial microprocessors.  
• cache hit rate/count to count the number of cache hits.  
• accessed memory pages to count the number of memory 
pages accessed during the execution of the code. 
Together with these general parameters, a set of more specific 
parameters can be collected and modeled. Hardware failures 
may significantly affect timing of a software application. 
Therefore, it is important to be able to model timing constraints 
that must be respected to obtain a correct result. Since the 
software execution time depends on the workload, timing 
constraints are usually defined as an expected execution time in 
relation to a given workload. Moreover, if margins can be 
accepted in the execution time, optional max accepted 
execution time and average accepted execution time properties 
can be defined. Hardware level failure modes (e.g., SBU) may 
deviate the correct software execution generating a set of 
possible software faulty behaviors (SFBs). In order to model 
the way a hardware failure enters the software domain and is 
propagated eventually generating a SFB we resort to the 
concept of software fault models (SFMs). We consider the 
SFMs has introduced by Vallero et. al in [7] that translate the 
effect of a hardware failure model into the software domain 
(e.g., an SBU translates into a wrong data of an instruction). 
SFMs represent the link between the hardware and the software 
layer of a full system stack. The SFBs describe how a software 
component reacts to a given SFM. We consider three main 
classes of SFBs: timing (e.g., early/late execution), data (e.g., 
incorrect data, no data produced, etc.), and responsiveness 
(e.g., responsive, partial responsive, fully unresponsive, etc.). 
Characterizing the SFBs of a software component means 
providing the probability of observing a behavior in the 
presence of one or a combination of SFMs. Due to the limited 
space available in this paper, the reader may refer to [7] for a 
detailed description of the concept of SFM and for a 
preliminary taxonomy. 
Fig. 3 shows an example of how RIIF-2 can be used to 
model a system including hardware and software. For brevity, 
the model of the full hardware layer is reduced to a single 
hardware component VECTORCALC_CORE able to execute 
vector computations. In this component we assume that fault 
injection experiments have been used to measure the 
occurrence rate of a set of SFMs in the presence of hardware 
failure modes and this information has been modeled by the 
SW_FM table (lines 5-9). Lines 12-32 define a high-level 
SW_COMPONENT template modeling the above-mentioned 
basic information items characterizing a software module. It 
uses the extended template formalism introduced in section 
II.B. In this template the constant SFB_ITEMS defines a set of 
labels that identify 11 SFBs expressing the time properties of 
the module (IN_TIME, UNDETECTABLE, EARLY, 
LATE), the responsiveness of the module 
(FULL_UNRESPONSIVE, PARTIAL_UNRESPONSIVE, 
RESPONSIVE) and the data integrity of the module 
(DATA_BENIGN, NO_DATA, EDC, NON-EDC). 
Egregious Data Corruptions (EDCs) indicate software 
outcomes that significantly deviate from the error-free 
outcomes while NON-EDC indicate small or no deviations in 
the obtained results [13]. Line 20 introduces a key information 
for the template. Each instance of SW_COMPONENT must 
define the target hardware execution platform through the new 
RIIF-2 keyword platform thus establishing a link between 
the software and the hardware layer as explained later in this 
section. Lines 23-30 show instead an example of the use of the 
newly introduced table data structure to describe both time 
constraints and SFBs. Both items cannot be described as simple 
single-value parameters, but require an aggregation of a set of 
heterogeneous information. In particular the template declares 
the two tables and their headers that in turn define the 
information that will be stored when the template will be 
implemented by a component. A table header is a vector whose 
elements are defined inline with a comma separated list 
enclosed within {} brackets. The number of elements of the 
vector sets the header dimension dynamically.  
To further emphasize on the capability of the table data 
structure, let us consider the implementation of the 
SW_COMPONENT template reported in lines 34-54 of Fig. 3. In 
this component besides setting the basic information defined in 
the template line 43 sets the value of the target platform and 
links this software to the VECTORCALC_CORE. Through the 
SW_FM table of the VECTORCALC_CORE component that 
links its failure modes to the SFMs, and through the SFB table 
of the VADD component that links each SFM to the SFB 
reliability information can be efficiently propagated from the 
hardware to the software layer of the stack. Moreover, line 44 
shows how the RIIF child_component keyword already 
available in the initial version of the language can be used to 
model the software hierarchy. In the VADD component, the use 
of the new table data type can be appreciated. Lines 46-48 
define the items (rows) of the TIME_CONSTRAINTS table. 
Each item reports the execution time (EXEC_TIME column), 
the average and the maximum time (AVG_TIME, MAX_TIME 
columns) for a given workload (WORKLOAD column). An even 
more complex use of the table data type is used in lines 48-52 
to define the items of the SFB table. In this case, each row of 
the table identifies an SFM. The probabilities of occurrence of 
each SFB in the presence of the SFM are defined. This is 
accomplished through the two columns named 
OCCURRING_SFB representing the list of SFBs and 
OCCURRING_SFB_RATE representing the associated 
probabilities. These two elements are two arrays defined within 
a column of a table. Resorting to the flexibility of these new 
data structures we have been able to represent complex data in 
a very compact and expressive manner.  
Fig. 4 (lines 1-12) shows instead an example of how 
inheritance can be easily used to define a modified version of 
the same software application implementing a software error 
detection mechanism based on variable duplication. In this 
example we show how the self operator can be used to easily 
model the time overhead introduced by the inserted protection 
mechanism w.r.t. the timing of the original application. For the 
sake of readability, the definition of the improved masking 
probabilities is not reported. Finally, Fig. 4 (lines 13-20) shows 
another way to describe the component proposed in Fig. 4. In 
this case we use the iterative operator [#] introduced in section 
II.B to redefine all entries of the TIME_CONSTRAINTS table 
with a single definition. The operator applies the same formula 
to all entries of a given table. This feature is particularly useful 
when managing big tables whose lines must be processed 
according to the same criteria, for example, scaling of all 
failure rates. 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION 
The definition of the RIIF-2 language is still underway.  
This prevent the availability of a complete toolchain to support 
the use of the language in both research and commercial tools. 
To promote the RIIF-2 initiative and to stimulate the 
contribution of the reliability community a public website 
available at http://riif.iroctech.com/ has been setup. This will 
serve as a central repository for the initiative where news and 
information will be published, tools will be released. 
Researchers interested in collaborating on the initiative can 
also refer to this website to join the RIIF-2 development team.  
V. CONCLUSIONS  
In this paper we presented the effort of two FP7 European 
projects (MoRV and CLERECO) toward the definition of a 
standardized language for modeling reliability information for 
complex digital systems taking into account the full system 
stack. Starting from the RIIF initiative, this paper introduces an 
extended language that includes a set of features able to 
increase the expressive power of the language with particular 
emphasis on its use in automatic reliability analysis tools. 
Moreover, the paper focuses on exploiting the new extended 
language to cover the characterization of reliability information 
for software modules that are of primary importance when 
cross-layer mechanisms must be analyzed and implemented for 
a new system. Through the joint dissemination end exploitation 
effort of two FP7 EU projects the extended RIIF language will 
support the development of next generation reliability analysis 
tools that will help to include reliability evaluation into an 
automated design flow at the same level as area, timing and 
power consumption. 
 
Fig. 3. System modeling with both hardware and software components. 
 
Fig. 4. Vector_ADD software with protection mechanisms.  
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01:component VECTORCALC_CORE; 
02:  // An hardware component performing vectorial calculations 
  ... 
03:  parameter fail_mode SBU; 
04:  assign SBU’RATE = 10; //obtained from radiation tests 
  ... 
05:  parameter SW_FM: table; 
06:  assign SW_FM’HEADERS = {FAILMODE, SFM, RATE}; 
07:  assign SW_FM’ITEMS = { // Obtained from fault injection 
08: [ “SBU”, “WRONG_DATA”, 0.3 * SBU’RATE ], 
09: [ “SBU”, “WRONG_INSTRUCTION”, 0.2 * SBU’RATE ], ... }; 
10:endcomponent 
11: 
12:template SW_COMPONENT; 
13:  // All programs must define the name, size, … 
14:  abstract parameter         NAME : string; 
15:  abstract parameter         SIZE : integer; 
16:  abstract parameter        LOOPS : integer ;  
17:  abstract parameter   PROTECTION : enum {NONE, VAR_DUP, ...};  
18:  abstract parameter  READ_ACCESS : integer ; 
19:  abstract parameter WRITE_ACCESS : integer ; 
20:  abstract platform   executed_on; 
 
21:  // List of possible SFB considered in our library  
22:  abstract constant    SFB_LIST:= {IN_TIME, UNDETECTABLE, EARLY,  
     LATE, FULL_UNRESPONSIVE, PARTIAL_UNRESPONSIVE, RESPONSIVE,  
     DATA_BENIGN, NO_DATA, EDC, NON-EDC}; 
24: 
25:  // Timing constraints depending on the workload 
26:  abstract parameter TIMING_CONSTRAINTS   : table; 
27:  impose             TIMING_CONSTRAINTS’HEADERS = {WORKLOAD,  
                        EXEC_TIM, MAX_TIME, AVG_TIME}; 
28: 
29:  // Software faulty behaviors table defining the probability  
     of occurrence of each SFB given the occurrence of each SFM. 
30:  abstract parameter SFB             : table; 
31:  impose             SFB’HEADERS = {SFM_TYPE, SFM,  
                        OCCURING_SFB, OCCURRING_SFB_RATE}; 
32:endtemplate 
33: 
34:component VADD implements SW_COMPONENT; 
35:  set NAME                  = “Vector ADD”; 
36:  set SIZE            = 524; 
37:  set SIZE’UNITS            = instructions; 
38:  set PROTECTION            = NONE; 
39:  constant NUMBER_OF_ITEMS := 10000; 
40:  set READ_ACCESS           = 76 * NUMBER_OF_ITEMS / 10000; 
41:  set WRITE_ACCESS          = 75 * NUMBER_OF_ITEMS / 10000; 
42:  set LOOPS                 = 3; 
43:  set executed_on           = VECTORCALC_CORE;  
44:  child_component  VPRINT; 
45:  ..... 
46:  assign TIMING_CONSTRAINTS’ITEMS = { 
47:    [ TEST_BENCH1, 0.0000001, 2, 0.000001 ], 
48:    [ TEST_BENCH2, 0.0000003, 2.1, 0.0000004 ] }; 
49:  assign SFB’ITEMS = { 
50:    [ "permanent", "WRONG_DATA", SFB_ITEMS, { 0.893, 0.107, 0,  
       0, 0.891, 0.042, 0.067, 0.413, 0.109, 0.052, 0.426 } ], 
51:    [ "permanent", "INSTR_REPLACEMENT", SFB_ITEMS, { 0.274,  
       0.726, 0, 0, 0.378, 0.348, 0.274, 0, 0.726, 0, 0.274 } ], 
52:    [ "transient", "WRONG_DATA", SFB_ITEMS, { 0.893, 0.009, 0,  
       0.098, 0.987, 0.001, 0.012, 0.968, 0.013, 0, 0.019 } ],  
53:    [ "transient", "INSTR_REPLACEMENT", SFB_ITEMS, { 0.614,  
       0.309, 0, 0.077, 0.309, 0, 0.691, 0.691, 0.309, 0, 0 } ]}; 
54:endcomponent 
 
01:component VADD_VARIABLE_DUPLICATION_VER1 extends VADD;  
02:  set NAME = "Vector ADD with Variable Duplication";  
03:  set PROTECTION = VAR_DUP;  
04:  assign TIMING_CONSTRAINS’ITEMS = {  
05:   (PROTECTION == VAR_DUP)? 
06:    [ "TEST_BENCH1", self+0.001, self+0.2, self+0.0015] :  
07:   [ "TEST_BENCH1", self , self , self ],  
08:   (PROTECTION == VAR_DUP)?  
09:   [ "TEST_BENCH2", self+0.001, self+0.2, self+0.0015] :  
10:   [ "TEST_BENCH2", self , self , self ] };   
11:endcomponent 
12: 
13:component VADD_VARIABLE_DUPLICATION_VER2 extends VADD;  
  ... 
14:  assign TIMING_CONSTRAINS’ITEMS[#][EXEC_TIME]=  
15:   (PROTECTION == VAR_DUP)? self + 0.001 : self ;  
16:  assign TIMING_CONSTRAINS’ITEMS [#][MAX_TIME]=  
17:   (PROTECTION == VAR_DUP)? self + 0.2 : self ;  
18:  assign TIMING_CONSTRAINS’ITEMS[#][AVG_TIME]=  
19:   (PROTECTION == VAR_DUP)? self + 0.0015 : self ; };  
  ...  
20:endcomponent 
 
